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Preface 
In the last three or four decades philosophers have started to pay more attention to the ontology 
of groups and the circumstances under which it might be legitimate and fruitful to ascribe to 
groups such properties as agency, consciousness, responsibility and personhood. This 
development has been paralleled by an increased interest in the nature of groups in the social 
sciences, psychology and the cognitive sciences. This special issue aims to forge a link between 
these various endeavours by examining the theoretical and practical uses they put the concept 
of a group to. At the same time, all of the seven contributions collected in the issue demonstrate 
in one way or another how philosophical reflection can contribute to integrating the 
different accounts offered within these multidisciplinary domains. 
“Reminiscing together: joint experiences, epistemic groups and sense of self” by Axel 
Seemann is an investigation into a rather neglected kind of group in the literature on social 
ontology. Attention has mostly been devoted to groups that emerge as result of their members 
sharing goals or being involved in collective actions. By contrast, Seemann focuses on 
“epistemic groups” formed when several individuals share in a particular kind of epistemic 
authority. This is a form of epistemic authority conferred on individuals in virtue of them 
remembering a past, jointly-experienced event. This form of remembrance, which the author 
calls “jointly reminiscing,” is characterized by a paradoxical feature: “when we jointly 
reminisce we try to conjure up, however imperfectly, a shared past that no single individual 
can episodically recall on her own.” Illustrating this point with literary and real life examples, 
the author shows how ubiquitous epistemic groups are, but also how fragile their existence is. 
Precisely because the past episode is not available to the single individual’s (episodic) memory, 
its recall is always open to debate and subject to dispute. But when such controversy emerges, 
do the individuals involved in the activity still constitute an epistemic group? The author doubts 
that “hard-and-fast answers are possible or even desirable”. At the same time, he suggests that 
one can talk of groups even in such cases although these are of an “uneasy and ambiguous” 
character but “no less powerful for that”. 
As the title of her article “The Ontology of Social Groups” suggests, Amie Thomasson’s 
contribution explores a set of ontological questions about social groups. Do social groups exist? 
And, if so, what are they? In line with the “easy” approach to ontology she defended in other 
publications, Thomasson contends that the answer to the first question should be 
straightforwardly positive. It is beyond doubt that natural languages have terms for social 
groups and that the application conditions for these terms are fulfilled in many cases. Yet, far 
more challenging is the question what social groups are. The author first scrutinizes various 
attempts at identifying a single feature shared by all social groups. She dismisses these in light 
of considerations suggesting that there exist radically different kinds of social groups. 
Thomasson argues that approaching the concept of social groups from a functional perspective 
may be a more promising endeavor. In other words, she recommends we ask “what do we want 
to use the concept of a social group for?” rather than look for the “real” or “common” essence 
of social groups. In fact, we will find that the concept “social group” has many functions: it 
justifies ascriptions of group intentions or responsibility, serve predictive and explanatory 
purposes in the social sciences, or helps diagnose social injustice. In general, “social group 
concepts have significance for us because they function to normatively structure our lives 
together”. Uncovering this normative dimension of groups is what we gain by applying the 
“normative approach” to these social phenomena. 
We think that many readers will profit from reading Tobias Hansson Wahlberg’s essay side-
by-side with Thomasson’s. One of the principal merits of Wahlberg’s paper is that it forges a 
link between the growing literature on the constitution of (social) groups and the metaphysics 
of mereology and temporal identity. Offering an original take on the celebrated multiple 
realizibility argument advanced by Fodor and others in favour of explanatory holism, Wahlberg 
accepts the conclusion of the argument but denies its premises. He argues that demonstrating 
the irreducibility of social sciences to an individualistic science does not require acceptance of 
the claim that the objects of social sciences (e.g., “the university”, “a team”) are multiply 
realizable. Nor does it require accepting ontological individualism according to which there 
are token-token(s) identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of 
“lower-level” individuals. So the bad news for anti-reductionist social scientists and 
philosophers is that they cannot both have their cake, and eat it. Wahlberg argues that multiple 
realizability arguments should be rejected precisely because they assume the existence of such 
token-token identities. However, the good news is that explanatory holism nevertheless 
survives and reductionism ultimately fails because showing the falsity of token-identity claims 
is in itself sufficient to establish anti-reductionism. 
Brian Epstein’s paper also presents a continuation, along different tracks, of themes taken 
up in Thomasson’s paper. Epstein takes up a cluster of questions surrounding the taxonomy of 
groups. He starts out by observing that there are great many different types – and subtypes – 
with wildly different functions, and suggests that it would be folly to expect there to be any 
simple and informative way of characterizing what they all have in common, or of dividing 
them up neatly into a few clear types. Indeed, he takes previous researchers to task for naively 
undertaking such a theoretical boondoggle.  In place of such a project, he develops what he 
calls a “bottom-up” approach, based upon profiles of the metaphysical features of groups: a 
construction profile, which characterizes “how groups of a given kind are built out of their 
members, how they persist over time and can be identified across worlds, and when they exist 
in the first place”; an extra essentials profile, which characterizes “abilities, powers, rights, 
responsibilities, and norms” of groups; an anchor profile, which supplies facts about why a 
group has various properties, such as its conditions for membership and its identity conditions; 
and an accident profile, which supplies “salient accidental properties of groups of a given kind, 
which can be equally or more important to understanding groups are.” These profiles provide 
a framework for understanding and classifying different types and subtypes of groups.  
While it addresses a different topic, Carol Rovane’s paper on group agency can also be read 
as ultimately aimed at spelling out some of the presuppositions and implications of collectivism 
about agency – the theoretical costs and benefits of collectivism, if you like. What exactly does 
one commit oneself to by saying that groups can be agents qua groups? According to Rovane, 
one such commitment is to the claim that groups have their own deliberative point of view. 
Another is that individual members of such groups will be the loci of “rational fragmentation”. 
This means that some of their intentional episodes will constitute the group's point of view, 
whereas some of their other intentional episodes will continue to constitute the individual 
agent’s point of view. Typically, there will be no unity between these perspectives. Underlying 
the idea of fragmentation is Rovane’s view of agency according which an agent is not to be 
equated with a biological organism going through various intentional episodes in the course of 
its life-span. Rather, to be an agent is to be committed to rational unity from a given perspective. 
The perspective can be more comprehensive than that of an individual’s life as in the case of 
group-level rational unity. However, the scope can also be smaller than that of an individual’s 
life. This in turn gives rise to the possibility that different parts of a single human life can each 
constitute a separate center of agency, and so each human life can be the site of multiple agents.  
León, Szanto and Zahavi in their “Emotional Sharing and the Extended Mind” explore the 
possibility that emotions are shared by a plurality of individuals. The authors defend what they 
call the “Socially Extended Emotion Thesis”, according to which “a subject’s emotion can 
extend to and incorporate another subject’s emotion”. The article begins by critically assessing 
one way of interpreting this thesis previously defended in the literature. On this view, the 
“Socially Extended Emotion Thesis” implies the “Token Identity Thesis”. The latter states that 
an emotion is shared if and only if the participants literally share one token of emotion. The 
authors reject the Token Identity Thesis arguing that “a necessary yet not sufficient condition 
for shared emotions is that the phenomenal character of a subject’s emotional experience is 
socially extended in the sense of standing in a relationship of constitutive interdependence with 
the phenomenal character of another subject’s emotional experience, without this entailing a 
breakdown of the individual boundaries of phenomenality”. Drawing upon classical 
phenomenology and the current debate about joint attention, the authors hold shared emotions 
to two requirements. The first is reciprocal other-awareness: individuals are aware of the 
presence and participation of each other in the episode of shared emotion. This requirement, 
by preserving self-other differentiation, can block the Token Identity Thesis. The second 
requirement is integration: integration is achieved when individuals “identify” with each other, 
that is, when they understand themselves as “one of us”. However, this account of shared 
emotion must be taken with a pinch of salt. It primarily focuses on emotions shared in face-to-
face encounters. While these are paradigmatic cases of shared emotions, the authors also 
recognize the existence of more anonymous forms of shared emotions which only partly meet 
these requirements. 
Like León, Szanto and Zahavi, Michaelian and Sutton’s paper considers the appropriateness 
of transplanting concepts of mental phenomena from the individual to the collective sphere. 
Specifically, their main aim is to introduce and articulate a novel theoretical concept, namely 
that of collective mental time travel. This innovation is motivated, on the one hand, by the 
observation that individual episodic memory and individual episodic future thought (as in 
planning or imagining) are increasingly viewed as two instances of individual mental time 
travel, and on the other hand by the fruitfulness of the concept of collective memory. While 
Michaelian and Sutton are optimistic about the potential fruitfulness of the concept of mental 
time travel for organizing philosophical and empirical research, they are also careful to point 
out that there may well be important disanalogies between individual and collective mental 
time travel – the latter, for example, may well lack some of the phenomenological features of 
the former.  
 Based on a memorable symposium in Copenhagen in the autumn of 2014, this special issue 
has been a long time coming. It is itself the output of a “thinking group” or perhaps even several 
“thinking groups”. We would especially like to thank the contributors and reviewers for their 
hard work and their persistence through often lengthy rounds of revision. We are also grateful 
to the editors and publisher of the journal Synthese, and in particular to the editor in chief Wiebe 
van der Hoek, for their unwavering support and encouragement. 
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